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THE RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT AS A
MECHANISM FOR GROUP AUTONOMY:
PROTECTION OF TIBETAN CULTURAL
RIGHTS
Michele L. Radin
Abstract: Traditional legal mechanisms have failed to protect minority cultural integrity
rights for the Tibetan people. Modem human rights law, however, offers a mechanism to
protect cultural integrity through group autonomy. This Comment argues that the right
to development can protect Tibetan cultural rights through such a claim for group auton-
omy over development.
The Tibetan government in exile describes China's plans for acceler-
ated economic growth in Tibet as "a part of China's 'final solution' for
Tibet." Traditional human rights law assumed economic growth
would encourage states to protect civil and political rights and eventu-
ally benefit individuals and groups. Economic development, however,
threatens the cultural identity of minorities like the Tibetans by sup-
plying an excuse for the degradation of their human rights guarantees.
As a minority group, the Tibetans hold a right to protect and
develop a group cultural identity, known as the right to cultural integ-
rity.2 The Tibetan government in exile has sought protection of
1. Tibet's Opening-up a New "Aggression," Say Exiles, Agence France Presse, Aug. 25, 1992,
available in LEXIS, Nexis file, Omni Library. The focus of China's new development policy in
Tibet, accompanying its continued goals of increased agricultural outputs and industrial growth,
is the opening-up of Tibet to rapid development of foreign trade, tourism, and investment. Id.;
Society and Environment; Tibet's Development Plans for Next Decade, Xinhua News Agency,
Mar. 13, 1991, rebroadcast by British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), Mar. 27, 1991. China
announced plans in 1992 to establish a special economic zone in Lhasa as part of this strategy to
lure investment. Economic Zone Statusfor Lhasa, FIN. TiMEs, May 13, 1992, at 6.
2. S. James Anaya uses the term cultural integrity to describe the value of preserving and
developing a group's cultural identity and requiring the protection and growth of the economic,
social, political, and cultural institutions necessary to ensure the survival of the group as a
distinct people. S. James Anaya, Indigenous Rights Norms in Contemporary International Law,
8 ARIz. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 17 (1991); see also Adeno Addis, Individualism,
Communitarianism, and the Rights of Ethnic Minorities, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 615, 658
(1992) (discussing the group right to culture and designating a people as not only a political but
also a cultural group); Ryszard Cholewinski, State Duty Towards Ethnic Minorities: Positive or
Negative?, 10 HuM. RTs. Q. 344, 351, 353 (1988) (examining state practice in the United Nations
Human Rights Committee to show a positive international law duty to protect group cultural
rights); Lyndel V. Prott, Cultural Rights as Peoples"Rights in International Law, in THE RIrHTS
OF PEOPLES 93, 102-03 (James Crawford ed., 1988) (asserting that development must include
socio-cultural values to protect cultural rights); Henry J. Steiner, Ideals and Counter-Ideals in
the Struggle over Autonomy Regimes for Minorities, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1539, 1546-47
(1991) (identifying the right of cultural survival as both an individual and group right). The
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Tibetan cultural integrity by calling for self-determination and inde-
pendence for Tibet. China has failed to respond domestically to pro-
tect Tibetan human rights and continues to reject Tibetan claims for
self-determination. Under modem international law, the right of peo-
ples to self-determination does not presume a right to secession, but
rather aims at the establishment of internal conditions for the enjoy-
ment of all human rights. Nevertheless, the international community,
while supporting Tibetan human rights, perceives an unacceptable risk
of secession in a minority claim for self-determination and a particular
fear of retaliation by China in the case of Tibet.
Because of the obstacles to a claim for the right to self-determina-
tion, the Tibetan people may find an alternative legal. claim to protect
their cultural integrity in the right to development. Generally, the
right to development entitles peoples to pursue economic, social, cul-
tural, and political development. While the state is t:he administrator
of the right, the state's right to pursue development is contingent upon
its observance of its duties to the people. Unlike the right to self-deter-
mination, a claim under the right to development would not invoke
external autonomy and the risk of secession, but could allow minority
groups like the Tibetans autonomy over economic, social, political,
and cultural development necessary to the survival of their distinct
cultures.
This Comment demonstrates that the right to development can ful-
fill the cultural integrity rights of minority groups like the Tibetans
through development autonomy. The first two parts of this Comment
set the background, reviewing the failure of traditional international
law mechanisms to fulfill Tibetan rights and the elaboration of the
right to development in international law. Part three creates a frame-
work for analyzing the right in the context of the structuralist reform
of human rights law and argues that, in effect, the right to develop-
ment fills a gap in international law by providing internal self-determi-
nation without risking secession. Part four then qualifies the Tibetans
as right-holders and suggests claims they might assert against China
under the right to development.
sources for the norm of cultural integrity include European minority guarantees; the U.N.
Charter; the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9,
1948, art. II, 78 U.N.T.S. 277; the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A.
Res. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR, l1th Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 52, at. 27, U.N. Doe. A/6316 (1967);
and the Declaration of the Principles of International Cultural Co-operation, UNESCO, 14th




Right to Development and Group Autonomy
I. THE FAILURE OF TRADITIONAL INTERNATIONAL
LAW MECHANISMS TO PROTECT TIBETAN
HUMAN RIGHTS
The international law norm of cultural integrity mandates that
states protect and develop the distinct cultural identities of internal
minority groups.3 China identifies the Tibetans as a "national minor-
ity," thereby requiring minority protections.4 China claims, however,
that Tibetan rights constitute a domestic issue, not an international
law concern, because China adequately protects minority rights and
Tibet has consented to Chinese rule.' According to China, its legisla-
tion of non-discrimination and equal protection of minorities fulfills its
customary international law duty to "take steps" to ensure the individ-
ual rights of group members.6 China asserts that its regional national
autonomy policy upholds civil and political rights by assuring Tibetan
language education, the use of Tibetan language in official communi-
cations, and a slight majority of Tibetan regional cadres.7
Chinese mechanisms of non-discrimination and equal protection,
however, have failed to fulfill Tibetan cultural rights. China's facial
protections have not eradicated discrimination and instead serve to
perpetuate Tibetan political powerlessness. Tibet's regional national
autonomy system, for example, offers at most illusory autonomy
because most powers are merely aspirational and expressly limited by
the requirement of central government permission.' Similarly, a cul-
tural protection such as Tibetan language schools is confounded by the
requirement of Chinese language for most government positions.' Not
only have China's facial protections failed, but China also flagrantly
3. See Anaya, supra note 2, at 15-24.
4. Arthur Rosett, Legal Structures for Special Treatment of Minorities in the People's Republic
of China, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1503, 1514-18 (1991).
5. See Information Office of the State Council [of the People's Republic of China], TIBET-
ITS OWNERSHIP AND HUMAN RiGHTs SITUATION, Sept. 22, 1992, reprinted in China on Its
Ownership of and Human Rights in Tibet, Xinhua News Agency, Sept. 22, 1992, rebroadcast by
BBC, Sept. 24, 1992 [hereinafter WHITE PAPER], pts. l(I), 1(1II); see also Nationalities Affairs
Officials on Dalai Lama and Tibet Development Policy, Xinhua News Agency, May 6, 1991,
rebroadcast by BBC, May 9, 1991 (criticizing the Dalai Lama and the international community
for trying to internationalize China's domestic affairs in Tibet).
6. See Premier Li Peng on Changes in Tibet, Xinhua News Agency, May 19, 1991, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File; WHITE PAPER, supra note 5, pts. l(III), 2(V)-2(XII); see also
infra notes 58-59 and accompanying text. See generally Rosett, supra note 4 (discussing
minority legislation in China);.
7. Regional National Autonomy Policy "Fully Implemented" in Tibet, Xinhua News Agency,
May 30, 1990, rebroadcast by BBC, June 1, 1990.
8. Rosett, supra note 4, at 1517-19.
9. Id. at 1520-21; International Comm'n of Jurists, Human Rights in the World: Tibet, 41
REVIEW 22, 25 (1988).
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attacks Tibetan cultural identity. The persecution of Buddhist monks
and nuns, for example, suppresses the heart of Tibetan political and
cultural voice.1" More subtle threats include the Chinese economic
development policy that uses state economic incentives to encourage
Han resettlement in Tibet, known as population transfer.1' Tibetans
and observers criticize population transfer as an attack on Tibetan cul-
tural identity because it effectively dilutes the Tibetan population. 2
Likewise, China's expansion of tourism in Tibet disguises a cultural
threat as a benefit; while tourism has led China to restore Buddhist
temples destroyed in the Cultural Revolution, 3 Tibetans fear cultural
stagnation or "disneyfication" as their cultural heritage becomes a
tourist attraction instead of an evolving identity.14
China also denies that Tibetans have an international law claim
under the right to self-determination. 5 China invaded Tibet in 1951,
ostensibly to "liberate" Tibet from foreign imperialists and reunify
Tibet with its historic sovereign. 6 China claims that the Dalai Lama's
government supported the "liberation" and the "reincorporation" of
the territory in the 1951 Agreement of the Central People's Govern-
ment and the Local Government of Tibet on Measures for the Peace-
ful Liberation of Tibet.' China insists, therefore, that Tibet never
10. See International Comm'n of Jurists, supra note 9, at 22-23 (documenting the brutal
suppression of large demonstrations in 1987 and 1988, resulting in beatings, shootings, deaths,
and mass arrests of monks); Warren W. Smith, China's Tibetan Dilemma, FLETCHER F., Winter
1990, at 77, 77 (1990) (discussing demonstrations in 1988 and 1989 that led to China closing
Tibet to foreign press and tourists).
11. See "Self-Determination" vs Individual Human Rights, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Nov.
12, 1992, at 20.
12. In 1992, the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization, a nongovernmental
organization composed of peoples, including Tibetans, seeking self-determination condemned
population transfer as a crime against humanity. Id. According to the Tibetan government in
exile, in 1992 Chinese in Tibet outnumbered Tibetans 7.5 million to 6 million. Tibetan Exile
Welcomes Opening of Tibet, with Reservations, Agence France Presse, Aug. 14, 1992, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File.
13. See International Comm'n of Jurists, supra note 9, at 24.
14. Prott, supra note 2, at 103; Smith, supra note 10, at 83 n.14.
15. See, eg., Premier Li Peng on Changes in Tibet, supra note 6 (rejecting the notion of an
independent Tibet). China expressly recognizes the right of peoples to self-determination.
MICHAEL C. VAN WALT VAN PRAAG, THE STATus OF TIBET: HISTORY, RIGHTS, AND
PROSPECTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, 190-92 (1987).
16. Agreement of the Central People's Government and the Local Government of Tibet on
Measures for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet, May 23, 1951, P.R.C.-Tibet, pmbl., reprinted in
VAN PRAAG, supra note 15, at 337-40 [hereinafter 17-Point Agreement]; WHITE PAPER, supra
note 5, pt. 1(1). China claims that the states were originally unified in the ninth century and that
Tibet was "officially incorporated" into China in the thirteenth century. Id. pt. I(I).
17. 17-Point Agreement, supra note 16, pmbl.; WHITE PAPER, supra note 5, pt. l(I). The
Dalai Lama's government denies the force of the unilaterally drafted 17-Point Agreement
because China coerced signatures from unauthorized Tibetan representatives. VAN PRAAG,
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existed as an independent state, and even if it had, Tibetans exercised
their self-determination and chose integration with China."8 In 1955,
China incorporated Tibet as the Tibetan Autonomous Region and in
1959 dissolved the representative government of the Dalai Lama.19 In
1959, the Dalai Lama established the Tibetan government in exile in
India to represent the Tibetan people.2°
Although the government in exile charges that China has defaulted
its legal duties to protect Tibetan minority rights, Chinese pressure has
restrained the international community from actively asserting a
Tibetan right to self-determination.21 The world community treated
China's 1951 invasion as an illegal aggression and occupation; never-
theless, weighing the existing pressure of the Korean War, the United
Nations chose to conciliate China by defeating a broadly supported
resolution condemning China's actions and recognizing Tibet's status
as an independent state.22 In reaction to the dissolution of the Dalai
Lama's government, his ffight into exile, and evidence from refugees of
human rights abuses, the General Assembly did pass resolutions in
1959, 1961, and 1965 denouncing China's actions.23 Most recently,
the U.N. Commission on Human Rights supported a 1992 resolution
condemning Chinese human rights violations in Tibet.24 Nongovern-
supra note 15, at 149. Moreover, the Dalai Lama acquiesced to the enforcement of the
Agreement under duress. Id. The Dalai Lama's government neither ratified nor sealed the
Agreement. Id. at 157. But see Ngapoi Ngawang Jigme" "Great Turning Point of Tibetan
History," Xinhua News Agency, Apr. 19, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File
(arguing for China that the Tibetan government freely negotiated and ratified the 17-Point
Agreement).
18. See Smith, supra note 10, at 79 (explaining China's theory of a unitary multinational state
as based on the self-determination of all groups by voluntarily incorporating into China).
19. VAN PRAAG, supra note 15, at 160-63. The dissolution of the Dalai Lama's government
violated the guarantee of political autonomy in the 17-Point Agreement. 17-Point Agreement,
supra note 16, art. 4.
20. VAN PRAAG, supra note 15, at 163. The Dalai Lama has served as the supreme spiritual
and temporal ruler of Tibet since the 1600s. See id. at 11. Scholars trace the status of Tibet as an
independent nation from the seventh century Tibetan Empire. Id. at 2. Likewise, individual
states supported the recognition of Tibet as an independent state at the time of the Chinese
invasion. Id at 146.
21. See Smith, supra note 10, at 84.
22. VAN PRAAG, supra note 15, at 145-46 (discussing a draft resolution submitted by El
Salvador).
23. Question of Tibet, G.A. Res. 1353, U.N. GAOR, 14th Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 237, U.N.
Doc. A/L.264 (1959) (condemning China for denying Tibetan cultural and religious rights);
Question of Tibet, G.A. Res. 1723, U.N. GAOR, 16th Sess., Supp. No. 17, at 296, U.N. Doc. A/
L.380 (1961) (adding that China was violating the U.N. Charter and the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, including the right to self-determination); Question of Tibet, G.A. Res. 2079,
U.N. GAOR, 20th Sess., Supp. No. 14, at 99, U.N. Doc. A/L.473 (1965).
24. Eric Kolodner, Tibet's Shattered Hopes, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Mar. 25, 1992, at 19
(blaming the failure of the European Community-sponsored resolution on a U.S. draft submitted
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mental organizations also routinely challenge China's right to govern
Tibet and human rights abuses.25
On the state level, the U.S. Congress has persistently called on the
executive branch to support Tibetan self-determination and to link aid
to China with human rights improvements in Tibet.26 States receive
the Dalai Lama as a dignitary, but without according him political
status.2 7 The international community's unwillingness to demand
independence or self-determination for Tibet has, therefore, foreclosed
that international law remedy for violations of Tibetan cultural integ-
rity rights. 28
II. THE RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW
The right to development synthesizes pre-existing human rights that
already have consensus as international law.29 The core sources of the
right are binding on all states as customary law: the U.N. Charter, the
Universal Declaration on Human Rights, and the International Cove-
nants.30 Moreover, the right expressly implements the U.N. goal to
to assuage Congress while deliberately breaking the supporting coalition to protect relations
with China).
25. In 1959, the International Commission of Jurists presented tLe United Nations with
prima facie evidence of genocide in Tibet. VAN PRAAG, supra note 15 at 169. A 1988 report
found that deep Tibetan dissatisfaction with Chinese rule persists. International Comm'n of
Jurists, supra note 9, at 23. While denying allegations of human rights abuses, China refuses
inspection by human rights bodies. Id at 25.
26. See, eg., Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993, Pub. L. No.
102-138, § 355, 105 Stat. 647, 713-14 (1991) (describing the Dalai Lama and the government in
exile as the representatives of the Tibetan people, supporting Tibet's status as a distinct and
sovereign identity, and recalling United States recognition of the illegality of Chinese occupation
and of the Tibetan right to self-determination). See generally W. Gary Vause, Tibet to
Tienanmen: Chinese Human Rights and United States Foreign Policy, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1575
(1989) (reviewing United States reactions to human rights violations in Tibet).
27. VAN PRAAG, supra note 15, at 169.
28. For the argument for the Tibetan right to self-determination, see id at 189-204.
29. Philip Alston, The Right to Development at the International Level, in THE RIGHT TO
DEVELOPMENT AT THE INTERNATIONAL LEVEL 99, 107 (Rene-Jean Dupuy ed., 1980).
30. David M. Trubek, Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights in the Third World: Human
Rights Law and Human Needs Programs, in 1 HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW:
LEGAL AND POLICY IssuEs 205, 209-12 (Theodor Meron ed., 1984). The Report of the
Secretary General cites specific international law sources for the right including: U.N. CHARTER,
arts. 55, 56; Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 A, 3rd Sess., at 135, arts. 22,
26(2), U.N. Doe. A/810 (1948); International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR, l1th Sess., Supp. No. 15, at 49, arts. 1, 2(1), 11, U.N.
Doe. A/6316 (1967); special human rights conventions on apartheid, education, and
discrimination; regional instruments such as the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties
of Man, OAS Res. XXX (1953); agency charters; resolutions of the General Assembly and U.N.
bodies on development, self-determination and the New Economic Order; the UNESCO
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remove structural obstacles to human rights enjoyment by incorporat-
ing the international law duties of solidarity, reparations for colonial-
ism and neo-colonialism, and moral and economic global
interdependence. 3 The Declaration on the Right to Development
(the "Declaration") explicitly asserts the peremptory right of self-
determination as the basis for the right of peoples to "pursue their
economic, social and cultural development., 32
The elaboration of the right to development by the United Nations
further demonstrates state consensus for the right.33 The U.N. Com-
mission on Human Rights conducted the first formal discussion of
development as a right in 1977, and the international community
quickly supported its recognition. 34 Two years later, the Secretary-
General released a study on the right to development, followed by fur-
ther resolutions and studies in the General Assembly.35 Meanwhile,
developing states demonstrated consensus by incorporating the right
Declaration on Race and Racial Prejudice, UNESCO Doc. 20C/3/1.1/2 (Nov. 27, 1978); and the
African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, O.A.U. Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 Rev. 5 (June 26,
1981) [hereinafter African Charter]. Jack Donnelly, In Search of the Unicorn: The Jurisprudence
and Politics of the Right to Development, 15 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 473, 479 (1985) (citing The
International Dimensions of the Right to Development as a Human Right in relation with other
Human Rights based on International Cooperation, including the Right to Peace, taking into
account the Requirements of the New International Economic Order and the Fundamental
Human Needs, Report of the Secretary-General, para. 78ff, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1334 (1979)
[hereinafter Report of the Secretary-General]).
31. Paul H. Brietzke, Consorting with the Chameleon, or Realizing the Right to Development,
15 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 560, 562 n.8 (1985) (citing Report of the Secretay-General, supra note 30,
arts. 42, 54, 47, 48).
32. Declaration on the Right to Development, G.A. Res. 128, U.N. GAOR, 41st Sess., Supp.
No. 53, pmbl., para. 6, U.N. Doc. A/41/925 (1986).
33. Based on China's consistent, express promotion of the right to development, this
Comment treats China as bound by the obligations of the right to development. See, eg.,
National Seminar Condemns "Human Rights Diplomacy'" Renmin Ribao, Oct. 18, 1992,
rebroadcast by BBC, Nov. 5, 1992 (calling on the international community to "first attach utmost
importance" to the right to development); U.N. Should Give Priority to Right to Development:
Chinese Ambassador, Xinhua News Agency, July 15, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
Omni File (calling for the United Nations to give priority to the right to development); White
Paper (10): Active Participation in International Human Rights Activities (a), Xinhua News
Agency, Nov. 1, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File (policy position paper
stating that "priority should be given to the safeguarding of the right of the people of the
developing countries to subsistence and development"). But see Donnelly, supra note 30, at 473
(denying the existence of a right to development); Roland Rich, The Right to Development: A
Right of Peoples?, in THE RIGHTS OF PEOPLES, supra note 2, at 39, 51-52 (suggesting the right to
development still lacks consensus).
34. Chair of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights Keba M'Baye first called for
recognition of the right to development in a 1972 article and initiated the first formal discussion
of the right in 1977. Donnelly, supra note 30, at 474 (citing Keba M'Baye, Le Droit au
developpement comme un droit de l'homme, 5 REvuE DE DRorr DE L'HoMME 505 (1972)).
35. Id. at 475.
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into the African Charter.3 6 In 1981, the Commission on Human
Rights established the Working Group of Governmental Experts on
the Right to Development to draft a declaration, seeking consensus by
filling the Working Group with representatives of all ideologies.37 The
General Assembly endorsed the language of the Working Group draft
with few amendments, and in 1986 the United Nations adopted the
Declaration on the Right to Development 146 to 1, 8 abstentions.38
Scholarly interpretation of the right-holder, duty-bearer, and duties of
the right to development has supplemented U.N. and state consensus.
A. Right-Holders
The right to development has no legal force unless a right-holder
can make a claim. The Declaration refers to individuals, peoples, and
states as beneficiaries of development while never clearly defining the
right-holder. 3" Scholars have elaborated the definition of the right-
holder by generally recognizing the right to development as a peoples'
36. See African Charter, supra note 30. Consensus was also reaffirmed by developing states in
the Kuala Lumpur Declaration adopted at the 1992 Second Ministerial Conference of
Developing Countries and the 1992 Jakarta Message adopted by the Non-Aligned Movement
Countries in 1992. Jakarta Message Affirms NAM Position on Major International Issues, Xinhua
News Agency, Sept. 6, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File; Ministers in Kuala
Lumpur Declaration Call for New Global Partnership, Xinhua News Agency, Apr. 29, 1992,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File.
37. The experts included representatives from Panama, the United States, USSR, India, the
Netherlands, France, Iraq, Cuba, Bulgaria, Algeria, Syrian Arab Republic, Senegal, Ethiopia,
and Yugoslavia. Structure of the United Nations, 1985 U.N.Y.B. 1412; see also Dinah Shelton, A
Response to Donnelly and Alston, 15 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 524, 525 (1985).
38. Rich, supra note 33, at 51. The Commission would not sponsor E, Working Group draft
because of disagreements on the final text, so Yugoslavia proposed a draft to the General
Assembly based on Working Group drafts. Id. The General Assembly'3 amendments clarified
the right of peoples to sovereignty over natural resources. Id. The single "no" vote came from
the United States, rejecting the Declaration because of vagueness, the linkage of development and
disarmament and the implication of a duty of resource transfer to deeloping nations. 1986
U.N.Y.B. 719-20. The abstentions, including such large international donors and human rights
proponents as Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Norway, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the
Federal Republic of Germany, voiced similar objections as well as the traditional individual
rights bias against peoples' rights. Id. at 720.
39. Article 1 identifies the right-holders as both peoples and individuals: "every human
person and all peoples are entitled to participate in, contribute to, and enjoy economic, social,
cultural and political development .... Declaration on the Right to Development, supra note
32, art. 1(1). Article 2, however, focuses on an individual right: "The human person is the
central subject of development and should be the active participant and beneficiary of the right to
development." Id. art. 2(1). Article 2 also declares that "[s]tates have the right and the duty to
formulate appropriate national development policies .... " Id. art. 2(3).
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right." Analogous to the right of peoples to self-determination, the
benefits and power to make a claim thus flow to a group."'
The identification of groups as peoples in international law histori-
cally has been controversial. States, however, clearly do not qualify as
peoples for human rights claims.42 Even in a "representative" govern-
ment, the state merely administers rights for the peoples.4a Peoples
exercise the right to development against states.' Notably, the Afri-
can Charter explicitly separates peoples as right holders and states as
duty-bearers to ensure the exercise of that right by peoples.4a
B. Duty-Bearers
The Declaration identifies the duty-bearers of development as indi-
viduals, peoples, states, and the international community. The Decla-
ration asserts aspirational duties for individuals and peoples towards
each other.4 6 Internally, states hold "the right and the duty to formu-
late appropriate national development policies." 47 States and the
world community bear external duties to cooperate in the removal of
development obstacles and to create an international development
40. See, eg., Brietzke, supra note 31, at 593.
41. Even scholars who cling to the Western bias towards individual rights recognize that full
enjoyment of individual rights requires some protection of group rights. See Rich, supra note 33,
at 43. Even if the goal of the right were regarded as merely individual development, the group
must still be the means. Brietzke, supra note 31, at 593.
42. Richard Falk, The Rights of Peoples (In Particular Indigenous Peoples), in THE RIGHTS
OF PEOPLES, supra note 2, at 17, 25.
43. David Makinson, Rights of People" Point of View of a Logician, in THE RIGHTS OF
PEOPLES, supra note 2, at 69, 73.
44. Id. at 77; see also Patrick Thornberry, Self-Determination, Minorities, Human Rights: A
Review of International Instruments, 38 INT'L & Comp. L.Q. 867, 876 (1989) (arguing that the
lack of a representative government gives a people the right to self-determination regardless of
the principle of territorial integrity). Equating the state with peoples would presume that the
state always represents the interests of groups within its borders. Makinson, supra note 43, at 77.
If peoples were defined as the state, then a challenge to the state's development policy would be
impossible and the goals of the right, peoples' participation in, contribution to and benefit from
development, would be subject to the whims of the state. Brietzke, supra note 31, at 566-67.
45. "All peoples shall have the right to their economic, social and cultural development ....
States shall have the duty, individually or collectively, to ensure the exercise of the right to
development." African Charter, supra note 30, arts. 22(1), (2).
46. Declaration on the Right to Development, supra note 32, art. 2.
47. Id. art. 2(3). The Declaration's recognition of a state's "right" to make development
policy does not make the state a right-holder but merely acknowledges state sovereignty. See
supra note 43 and accompanying text.
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structure.4" The Declaration also implies a duty of resource and tech-
nology transfer to developing countries.49
C. Duties of States Under the Right to Development
The Declaration restricts the state's exercise of its duty and, there-
fore, its right to administer development policy in two ways: (1) by
mandating the participation, consultation, and benefit of the people as
right-holders and (2) by requiring development of a synthesis of eco-
nomic, social, political, and cultural rights. To fulfill its duty, a state
must "aim at the constant improvement of the well-being of the entire
population and of all individuals, on the basis of their active, free and
meaningful participation in development and in the fair distribution of
the benefits resulting therefrom."50 The Declaration further demands
that "[s]tates should encourage popular participation in all spheres [of
development]."5 " The requirement of distribution of benefits is reem-
phasized by the duty to "ensure... equality of opportunity for all in
their access to basic resources, education, health services, food, hous-
ing, employment and the fair distribution of income."5 2 States thus
must not only implement the economic, social, cultural, and political
development of the peoples, but must also do so in a certain manner-
by involving the people in the decision making and assuring their
receipt of the benefits.
States also have the duty to address political, social, cultural, and
economic rights as a synthesis. Elaboration of the right in the United
Nations prior to the Declaration specifically defined development not
as a mere right to economic development but as a right to economic
development in synthesis with other rights."3 The express basis of the
48. Declaration on the Right to Development, supra note 32, art. 3(3).
49. See id. art. 4(2). While states may not expressly admit a duty tc development assistance,
developed state practice of treating such aid as a duty of development demonstrates consensus.
Rich, supra note 33, at 46-47.
50. Declaration on the Right to Development, supra note 32, art. 2(3).
51. Id. art. 8(2).
52. Id. art. 8(1).
53. Donnelly, supra note 30, at 481 (quoting discussions in the United Nations); Shelton,
supra note 37, at 525 (citing Report of the Working Group of Governmental Experts on the Right
to Development, U.N. Comm'n on Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1985/ 1 (1985)). While
states quickly accepted the right to development, scholars debated whether the right to
development could achieve the goal of synthesizing development rights. Some scholars were
concerned that the right constituted primarily an economic right and established a hierarchy of
rights that preconditioned fulfillment of civil and political rights on economic development, thus
allowing developing nations a lower standard of human rights and ar, excuse to delay human
rights protection; the end of the right to development would be economic change, not human
rights. Donnelly, supra note 30, at 504, 506. For both sides of the scholarly debate preceding the
Declaration, see generally id.; Philip Alston, The Shortcomings of a "Garfield the Cat"Approach
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recognition of the right by the General Assembly was the interdepen-
dence and indivisibility of all human rights.54 Accordingly, the Decla-
ration defines development as "a comprehensive economic, social,
cultural and political process,"55 and demands "equal attention"56 to
all rights, not a preference for certain areas or economic development
as a precondition for fulfillment of other rights.57
III. THE RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT AS A MECHANISM
FOR GROUP AUTONOMY
This section first suggests that the right to development guarantees
the cultural integrity of peoples. Secondly, an analysis of the evolution
of human rights law demonstrates that the international community
accepts group autonomy as a legal mechanism to fulfill cultural integ-
rity claims. Finally, this section argues that as a cultural integrity
guarantee elaborated within modem, structuralist human rights law,
the right to development can operate as a mechanism for group
autonomy.
A. The Right to Development Protects Cultural Integrity
The norm of cultural integrity derives from two legal sources: the
right to self-determination and minority guarantees. The right to self-
determination expressly incorporates cultural integrity by guarantee-
ing the right of peoples to pursue economic, social, and cultural devel-
opment.58 Similarly, minority guarantees recognize cultural integrity
to the Right to Development, 15 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 510 (1985) (defending the right to
development).
54. Declaration on the Right to Development, supra note 32, pmbl., para. 10, states in part:
Concerned at the existence of serious obstacles to development, as well as to the complete
fulfillment of human beings and of peoples, constituted, inter alia, by the denial of civil,
political, economic, social and cultural rights, and considering that all human rights and
fundamental freedoms are indivisible and interdependent and that, in order to promote
development, equal attention, and urgent consideration should be given to the
implementation, promotion and protection of civil, political, economic, social and cultural
rights and that, accordingly, the promotion of, respect for, and enjoyment of certain human
rights and fundamental freedoms cannot justify the denial of other human rights and
fundamental freedoms.
55. Id. pmbl., para. 2.
56. Id. pmbl., para. 10.
57. "[IThe promotion of, respect for, and enjoyment of certain human rights and fundamental
freedoms cannot justify the denial of other human rights and fundamental freedoms." Id.
58. "All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely
determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural
development." International Convenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note
30, art. I; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 2, art. I.
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by requiring special protection of minority cultural rights. 9 Indeed,
state practice has established a customary law duty of" affirmative state
action to protect and develop minority culture."
Because it invokes cultural integrity guarantees, the right to devel-
opment can offer a legal mechanism to fulfill those rights. An express
purpose of the Declaration is the fulfillment of the right of self-deter-
mination through economic, social, political, and cultural develop-
ment.61 Moreover, state duties in the Declaration correlate to state
customary law duties to protect the cultural integrity of minority
groups.6
2
B. A Structuralist Approach to Cultural Integrity
Human rights law has evolved to find group autonomy an appropri-
ate legal mechanism to ensure group cultural integrity rights. Histori-
cally, international law tried to answer group human rights claims
through two mechanisms: (1) the protection of individual and group
rights through external autonomy under the right to self-determina-
tion or (2) the protection of individual rights through non-discrimina-
tion.63  Neither approach, however, effectively fulfilled cultural
integrity guarantees.
Self-determination incorporates both an internal right to human
rights protection and an external right to freedom from domination; in
the decolonization era, however, states treated self-determination as
merely external and as presuming a right to secession." As a result,
group claims for external autonomy were limited by the sovereignty
doctrine and generally restricted to non-self-governing overseas colo-
nies.65 Even when international law explicitly rejected the presump-
59. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 2, art. 27
(recognizing the minority right to culture, religion, and language); Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, supra note 2, art. II (defining genocide as the "intent
to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group").
60. Cholewinski, supra note 2, at 344; Hurst Hannum, Contemporary Developments in the
International Protection of the Rights of Minorities, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1431, 1444 (1991).
61. See supra notes 33, 58 and accompanying text.
62. See supra notes 50, 60 and accompanying text.
63. S. James Anaya, The Capacity of International Law to Advance Ethnic or Nationality
Rights Claims, 75 IOWA L. REV. 837, 837-38 (1990); Hannum, supra note 60, at 1434-35.
64. See Anaya, supra note 63, at 841.
65. See, e-g., HuOsT HANNUM, AUTONOMY, SOVEREIGNTY, AND SELF-DETERMINATION:
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tion of secession,66 states resisted any exercise of self-determination.6'
As the focus of the United Nations has shifted away from decoloniza-
tion to human rights protection, the right has evolved to emphasize
internal self-determination, including cultural integrity; nevertheless,
states still perceive a conflict between state sovereignty and a claim
under the rubric self-determination. 8
Traditionally, groups not qualified for self-determination had to rely
on state administration of international standards for the non-discrim-
ination and equal protection of individuals.6 9 Minorities and indige-
nous groups were denied status as peoples because states feared self-
determination claims would disrupt their territorial integrity.7 °
Because it relied on the state and addressed only individual rights,
however, non-discrimination failed to fulfill minority guarantees for
cultural integrity.71
Because of the failure of both mechanisms, the United Nations
sought more effective methods to implement pre-existing human rights
guarantees. The methodology of human rights evolved from reliance
on states to uphold international human rights standards to the identi-
fication and removal of the "structural obstacles" in the international
law system that bar full enjoyment of human rights.72 The primary
66. See Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and
Co-operation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, pmbl., G.A.
Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 121, U.N. Doe. A/8028 (1970) (explicitly
defining a flexible right of self-determination to be exercised by a choice of modes of political
autonomy: independence, free association, integration, or "the emergence into any other political
status freely determined by a people").
67. Makinson, supra note 43, at 75-76.
68. Anaya, supra note 2, at 34; Robert A. Williams, Jr., Encounters on the Frontiers of
International Human Rights Law: Redefining the Terms of Indigenous Peoples' Survival in the
World, 1990 DUKE L.J. 660, 685-86 n.81.
69. Anaya, supra note 63, at 837. Sources for the non-discrimination mechanism include:
U.N. CHARTER, art. I, para. 3; Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 30, art. 2;
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 2, art. 2(l); International
Covenant on Economic, Cultural and Social Rights, supra note 30, art. 2(2); and International
Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination, Jan. 4, 1969, 660 U.N.T.S.
195. Id.
70. See supra note 64 and accompanying text; see also Russel L. Barsh, Indigenous North
America and Contemporary International Law, 62 OR. L. Rav. 73, 84-94 (1983) (tracing the
evolution of the U.N. definition of peoples to include indigenous groups).
71. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
72. Rich, supra note 33, at 41. Roland Rich identifies four phases of U.N. human rights
action: the 1945-55 post-war "normative" period concentrating on standard-setting; 1955-65,
emphasizing the promotion of human rights by requiring state reporting and advisory
recommendations; 1965-75, seeking protection of human rights by more direct activities such as
appointment of special rapporteurs, investigations, and the adoption of procedures for handling
complaints; and the current period, exemplified by the right to development, building a structural
approach. Id. at 42.
707
Washington Law Review Vol. 68:695, 1993
structural obstacle to effective human rights protection was the ten-
dency of states to create a hierarchy of rights that preferred civil and
political rights of individuals while the internati onal community
assumed that state economic growth would ensure domestic human
rights protection. 3 Not only does a hierarchy allow states to excuse
the degradation of subordinated rights, the traditional individual
rights bias ignored the larger social and economic conditions perpetu-
ating denial of all human rights.74 To overcome these obstacles, struc-
turalism views economic, social, cultural, and political rights as
interdependent and indivisible. Effective legal mechanisms must treat
rights as a synthesis, not in isolation or in a hierachy.75 Likewise,
structuralism relates individual fights to social conditions by recogniz-
ing group or "peoples" rights. Group power through social and eco-
nomic change better ensures individual civil and political rights than
the state.76
73. Id.; Alston, supra note 29, at 108-09. In the 1960s the United Nations began to realize
that its emphasis on economic growth failed to help the neediest in developing states and actually
supplied an excuse for degradation of human rights. Ved P. Nanda, The Right to Development
Under International Law-Challenges Ahead, 15 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 431, 433 (1985) (tracing the
history of U.N. development programming). By 1970, at the start of the Second United Nations
Development Decade, the U.N. redirected its economic policy away 'rom reliance on trickle
down benefits of economic growth acceleration and state protection of human rights and towards
structural development that directly empowered the neediest:
As the ultimate purpose of development is to provide increasing opportunities to all
people for a better life, it is essential to bring about a more equitable distribution of income
and wealth for promoting both social justice and efficiency of production, to raise
substantially the level of employment, to achieve a greater degree of income security, to
expand and improve facilities for education, health, nutrition, housh-g and social welfare,
and to safeguard the environment. Thus, qualitative and structural changes in the society
must go hand in hand with rapid economic growth, and existing disparities-regional,
sectoral and social-should be reduced. These objectives are both determining factors and
end-results of development; they should therefore be viewed as integrated parts of the same
dynamic process and would require a unified approach ....
International Development Strategy for the Second United Nations Development Decade, G.A.
Res. 2626, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 255, para. 18, U N. Doe. A/8028 (1970)
[hereinafter International Development Strategy]; see also Nanda, supra, at 433. As a result, the
United Nations integrated economic strategy for developing countries with the protection of civil
and political rights. Id. at 433-34.
74. See Alston, supra note 53, at 516-17.
75. Alston, supra note 29, at 102, 112; Rich, supra note 33, at 53-54; see, eg., International
Development Strategy, supra note 73; Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, G.A. Res.
3281, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, at 50, prmbl., art. 16, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974)
(agreeing that economic development requires global structural changes, including the end of
colonialism, apartheid, and racial discrimination).
76. See Alston, supra note 53, at 516-17.
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In regard to minority groups, structuralism can address cultural
integrity claims through the mechanism of group autonomy.77 Bear-
ing no history of a right to secession, group autonomy is politically
more palatable to states than the right of self-determination."8 More-
over, group autonomy for cultural integrity extends to the structuralist
synthesis of economic, social, and political rights.79
C. The Right to Development in the Structuralist Framework
As a guarantee of cultural integrity, the right to development can
provide a mechanism for group autonomy under the structuralist
model. The right to development, first considered in the early years of
structuralist reform, fits neatly into the structuralist goal of achieving
pre-existing human rights through new legal mechanisms.8 0 Accord-
ingly, the Declaration protects human rights as a synthesis and specifi-
cally employs the language of structuralist reform." The emphasis on
international cooperation likewise exemplifies the purpose of removal
of structural obstacles. 2 Moreover, the mandate for peoples' involve-
77. See Anaya, supra note 63, at 842 (defining the end of modern self-determination as an
internal structure to preserve and develop a separate culture); Allen E. Buchanan, The Right to
Self-Determination: Analytical and Moral Foundations, 8 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMp. L. 41, 45-48
(1991) (describing modem self-determination as more than a right to political autonomy, but
rather a bundle of individual and group rights); see also ILO Convention Concerning Indigenous
and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, No. 169, June 27, 1989, in 72 ILO OFFICIAL BULL.,
ser. A, No. 2, at 59 [hereinafter ILO Convention 169] (recognizing autonomy of indigenous
peoples as a method to fulfill cultural integrity guarantees).
78. See Addis, supra note 2, at 660 n. 109 (distinguishing group autonomy as "cultural self-
determination" from traditional political and economic decolonization involving a right to
secession).
79. The United Nations Commission on Human Rights, for example, has extended the
cultural rights of minorities guaranteed in article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights to "include the right of persons, in community with others, to engage in
economic and social activities which are part of the culture of the community to which they
belong." Lubicon Lake Band v. Canada, Comm. No. 167/1984, U.N. Human Rights
Committee, reprinted in 11 Hum. Rrs. L.J. 305, 311 (finding Canada violated article 27 by
allowing the Alberta provincial government to grant private energy exploration leases on the
territory of the Lubicon Indians); see International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra
note 2, art. 27; see also Anaya, supra note 2, at 18-19. Likewise, the Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights has explicitly intepreted the right to the protection of health and well-being
guaranteed in the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man to include the group
right of cultural integrity. Case 7615, Inter-Am. C.H.R. Res. 12/85, 1985 INTER-AM. Y.B. ON
H.R. 264, 276,278 (finding that the construction of a highway and the subsequent influx of
miners into Yanomami territory injured the group's cultural integrity); see American Declaration
of the Rights and Duties of Man, supra note 30, art. XI.
80. See supra notes 29-30, 72 and accompanying text.
81. See supra notes 54-55, 75 and accompanying text.
82. See supra note 48 and accompanying text; see also Alston, supra note 29, at 110-11




ment derives from the goal of protecting human rights through social
conditions and relations, instead of relying on individual rights and
economic growth.83
The structuralist approach to cultural integrity also can supply the
right to development with a definition for peoples as right-holders. In
the decolonization era, peoples were identified by the goal of indepen-
dence; in the structuralist framework, however, peoples are defined by
the goal of cultural integrity.84 For example, despite the rejection by
the Inter-American Court of a group claim for self-determination
under the decolonization definition of peoples, the norm of cultural
integrity still qualified the Miskito Indians for group autonomy.85 The
label "minority," therefore, no longer serves as a bar to peoples'
rights.86 Instead, the identification of a group as a right-holder can be
determined from that group's qualification for cul.tural integrity: a
common cultural identification, a specific territory claim, and self-
identification of the composite individuals as a people.87
IV. A TIBETAN CLAIM UNDER THE RIGHT TO
DEVELOPMENT
Because the mechanisms of self-determination and non-discrimina-
tion have failed, the right to development can afford the Tibetans pro-
tection of their cultural integrity through the legal mechanism of
83. See supra notes 50-52, 76 and accompanying text.
84. Ian Brownlie, The Rights of Peoples in Modern International Law, in THE RIGHTS OF
PEOPLES, supra note 2, at 1, 5-6, 16 (James Crawford ed., 1988) (rejecting the labels of peoples,
minorities, or indigenous groups as arbitrary and contrary to the purposes of internal self-
determination and cultural integrity and instead proposing a case-by-case review of the level of
autonomy appropriate for each group).
85. Anaya, supra note 2, at 32 (discussing Report on the Situation of Human Rights of a
Segment of the Nicaraguan Population of Miskito Origin and Resolution on the Friendly
Settlement Procedure Regarding the Human Rights Situation of a Segment of the Nicaraguan
Population of Miskito Origin, OEA/Ser. L/V/II.62, doc. 10 rev. 3 (1983), OEA/Ser. L/V/II.62,
doc. 26 (1984) (protecting the cultural identity of Miskitos includes economic, land use, and
political autonomy rights).
86. Makinson, supra note 43, at 73 (noting that the label minority is now merely a relational
identification). Bangladeshis, the example of a non-colony group qualifying as peoples for the
right to self-determination, were also a minority in Pakistan. See Lung-Chu Chen, Self-
Determination and World Public Order, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1287, 1292-93 (1991).
Exemplifying the arbitrariness of these labels, Tibetans also could qualify as indigenous peoples
under ILO Convention 169, entitling them to a range of specific protections. See ILO Convention
169, supra note 77, pt. I, arts. l(l)(b), 1(2) (applying protections to groups with a historical
territorial attachment, separate social, economic, cultural, and political systems, and self-
identification).
87. See, e.g., Chen, supra note 86, at 1290.
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group autonomy.88 Tibetans must first qualify as a people under the
norm of cultural integrity.89 The Tibetans could then seek develop-
ment autonomy by demonstrating that China is failing to uphold its
duties as administrator of the right.
A. Tibetans Qualify as a People
By placing the right to development within the structuralist context
of group autonomy claims for cultural integrity, a people is broadly
defined as a group with a distinct culture, a territorial claim, and self-
identification. 90 The Tibetan people clearly satisfy these criteria. The
group has maintained a distinct cultural identity in its heritage, lan-
guage, religion, and unique political structures. 91 Tibetans also have
held a specific territorial claim to the Tibetan plateau as a political unit
since the Tibetan Empire in the seventh century and earlier as
nomadic tribes.92 Finally, Tibetans identify themselves as a people
and disidentify with the Chinese. Tibetans behave as a political unit
by remaining loyal to the Dalai Lama and opposing China by emigra-
tion and protest.93 They have resisted China's express policies of
assimilation and cultural destruction, most notably by retaining a
88. Analyzing the right to development as internal self-determination does not, however,
preclude simultaneous or subsequent claims for external self-determination. Peoples may seek
more than one international law claim. Moreover, self-determination establishes the conditions
for freedom, not an end of a static political order. See Anaya, supra note 2, at 35. This condition
of freedom, therefore, includes the internal power to change political structures. Development
autonomy thus may be a step to greater political autonomy, and a Tibetan claim for development
need not signal a surrender of claims for independence.
89. It could also be argued that China has conceded Tibetan status as a people by claiming
that Tibetans already exercised their self-determination. See supra notes 15-18 and
accompanying text. Tibetan self-determination is necessary to legitimize the theory that China is
a unitary multinational state founded by many peoples voluntarily joining into one nation.
Smith, supra note 10, at 77. Moreover, the criteria for national minority status mirrors that of
people status in international law: a stable group with a common language, territory, economy,
and culture. See Rosett, supra note 4, at 1515.
90. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
91. VAN PRAAG, supra note 15, at 194.
92. Id. at 2.
93. Id at 184-85. Religious adherence to the Dalai Lama is virtually indistinguishable from
political allegiance; historically, religion and state were one in Tibet. See supra note 20. The
Tibetan Constitution proposed by the government in exile likewise recognizes the Dalai Lama as
the head of state in an independent Tibet. Bureau of His Holiness the Dalai Lama,
CONsTIrurr oF TIBET, art. 29(1) (1963). Tibetans have broadly supported delegations from
the Dalai Lama. VAN PRAAG, supra note 15, at 184. Likewise, Tibetans persistently
demonstrate against Chinese occupation and in support of the Dalai Lama despite reports of
imprisonment, torture, and death for separatists. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
Approximately 100,000 Tibetans have fled China since 1959. Smith, supra note 10, at 81.
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strong Buddhist culture.94 By the norm of cultural integrity, Tibetans
thus qualify as a people, granting them status as right-holders under
the right to development.
B. The Tibetan Claim for Autonomy
The qualification of Tibetans as a people does not per se entitle them
to group autonomy. Qualification of indigenous peoples as right-hold-
ers in analogous group autonomy claims has turned not only on the
distinct character of the group, but also on a showing that the specific
actions of the state degrade the group's ability to maintain and develop
that distinctiveness.95 The Declaration similarly recognizes the right
of the governing state to administer development only where the state
fulfills its duties toward the people.96 As a people, therefore, Tibetans
can make a claim to development autonomy only by showing that
China is not fulfilling those duties.
China's duties are twofold: (1) equal attention to economic, social,
political, and cultural development as indivisible and interdependent
rights and (2) assurance of the participation, contribution, and benefit
of the people of Tibet in the development of each of those rights.9 7
China expressly supports the definition of development as a synthesis
of all rights and the requirement of peoples' involvement. 98 Moreover,
China particularly links the right to development -with the right to
self-determination, and thereby with cultural integrity.99
94. See International Comm'n of Jurists, supra note 9, at 24 (relating Chinese efforts to
suppress Buddhist culture).
95. See Anaya, supra note 2, at 32; see also supra note 79 and accompanying text.
96. Declaration on the Right to Development, supra note 32, art. 3(3). Another claim for
Tibetan development autonomy is China's failure as a state to represent the Tibetans. See
Thornberry, supra note 44, at 876 (arguing that despite the limitation of the sovereignty doctrine,
if a legal government fails to represent internal peoples, those peoples have a right to exercise
self-determination; a state that fails in its duties as a sovereign loses th. rights of sovereignty).
97. See supra notes 50-57 and accompaning text.
98. Chinese Delegate Speaks on Human Rights at Geneva Meeting Xinhua News Agency,
Feb. 5, 1992, rebroadcast by BBC, Feb. 8, 1992 (quoting Chinese representative to the United
Nations Commission on Human Rights: "'[t]he declaration of the right to development... is a
comprehensive process covering economy, society, culture and politics... [and] emphasizes that
all human rights and fundamental freedoms are interdependent and indivisible ... [and state
duties require] people as a whole should be encouraged to make concerted efforts in their active
participation.' "). Moreover, China consistently phrases its development strategy as chosen by
Tibetans. See, e.g., WHITE PAPER, supra note 5, pt. 2(XII) ("Tibet started to implement the
Eighth Five-Year Plan ....").
99. China Urges UN. Declaration on Right to Development, Xinhua News Agency, Nov. 9,
1985, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File ("[T]he right to national self-determination
[is] a precondition for the right to development."); China Stresses Right to Development as
Inalienable Human Right, Xinhua News Agency, Oct. 30, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis
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Chinese development strategies for Tibet show that China has failed
to fulfill both of its state duties. China treats the right to development
as a hierarchy of rights, placing economic development at the top.
China's strategy for economic growth expressly permits the delay of
human rights protections." ° The policy of population transfer, for
example, allows China to degrade cultural rights in the name of eco-
nomic expansion.101
China has likewise failed to assure Tibetan involvement in develop-
ment. Population transfer coupled with educational, employment,
and housing discrimination in favor of the Han settlers has ensured
that the direct benefits of economic growth do not run to Tibetans.10 2
Similarly, China has accompanied its "opening up" of Tibet with
increased suppression of Buddhist monks and nuns, the traditional
Tibetan political voice. 103 The exclusion of Tibetans from decision
making has further resulted in the development of Tibet for China's
use, not for the Tibetans' benefit. Investment is concentrated in sec-
tors such as the military that primarily benefit China." 4 Tibetans also
charge that increased agriculture production is occurring at the
expense of traditional Tibetan crops and lands and that the outputs are
intended solely for the Chinese people.105
The effects of China's hierarchy of rights and exclusion of Tibetans
from decision making and benefits embody the very obstacles to
human rights protection that the structuralist approach of the Decla-
ration seeks to overcome: degradation of political and cultural rights.
Library, Omni File (The right to development "implies the full realization of the right of peoples
to self-determination.").
100. See, ag., No Human Rights Without National Sovereignty, Xinhua News Agency, Sept.
12, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File (calling for international guidelines to
respect differing views and rates of human rights protection); China Opposes Western Definition
of Human Rights, UPI, Dec. 2, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File (supporting
step by step human rights protections in line with domestic values).
101. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
102. Asia Watch Committee Releases Report Criticizing, PR Newswire, Feb. 11, 1988,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, PR Newswire File (excerpt from Asia Watch Report finding
that Chinese actions in Tibet violate the International Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination, to which China is a signatory); Tibet's Opening-up a New
"Aggression," Say Exiles supra note 1.
103. Yojana Sharma, China: Two-Pronged Strategy to Tame Tibet, Inter Press Service, Oct.
15, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Inter Press Service File; see also supra note 9 and
accompanying text.
104. Lindy Washburn, Troubles in Shangri-La, Worldpaper, Aug. 1987, at 10, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, Worldpaper File.
105. Frank Viviano, Environmental Crisis in Tibet-Forests, Wildlife Threatened, S.F.
CHRON., Oct. 26, 1990, at A29 (condemning China's conversion of traditional nomadic grazing




China's right to administer development policy under the right
depends on its fulfillment of its duties in the Declaration. As a result
of China's failure to fulfill those duties, the Tibetan people have a
claim under the right to development to the mechanism of group
autonomy to protect their cultural integrity rights.
The situation in Tibet illustrates the failure of traditional human
rights mechanisms to implement group cultural integrity guarantees.
While the Tibetan people continue to struggle against Chinese policies
that degrade and destroy their cultural identity, the international com-
munity has refused to press a claim for self-determination. The inter-
national community could, however, be more receptive to a Tibetan
claim for development autonomy because it avoids the issue of seces-
sion, attains the goals of structuralist human rights reform, and fol-
lows the precedents of analogous grants of indigenous group
autonomy. The proposal of a Tibetan claim under the right to devel-
opment primarily seeks access to international forums; the outcome of
such a claim could range from increased international pressure on
China to linkages of development assistance with a Chinese guarantee
of Tibetan development autonomy. Although the right to develop-
ment does not resolve Tibetan calls for independence, Tibetans could
assure their cultural survival through development autonomy.
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